Abstract: The notion that Marx neither understood nor advocated the use of mathematics is a persistent one. His interest in both commercial and abstract mathematics spanned more than two decades, however, and culminated in two \contributions" to the foundations of the calculus: \On the Concept of the Derived Function" (1881) and \On the Concept of the Di erential" (1881). A detailed examination of these and other technical notebooks suggests that Marx's economics both motivated and informed his studies in mathematics and that these, in turn, in uenced his understanding of economic phenomena.
Introduction
It is unfortunate, perhaps, that recent debates concerning the use of \formal" or \technical" methods within the Marxian tradition seldom refer to Marx's own mathematical manuscripts, which were inaccessible to most scholars until the translation (Marx 1983) , almost two decades ago, of an obscure Soviet (Marx 1968) collection. 1 * The earliest versions of this paper bene tted from conversations with Antonio Callari, Cal Craven, John Geanakoplos and David Weiman. An abridged version, which owed much to Richard Cornwall's expertise in mathematics, was presented at the AESA Voices and Languages of Marxism conference in Amherst in December 1996, where Peter Hardin also introduced me to Brokmeyer's (1985) reading of the manuscripts. The current revisions were completed as a visiting scholar at UC San Diego, with generous leave support from Middlebury College. The usual disclaimers hold.
In fact, these manuscripts, almost a thousand handwritten sheets in all, have seldom attracted much attention outside the former Soviet Union, despite the e orts of some contemporaries and later scholars. In his speech at Marx's funeral, for example, Engels himself o ered what must have seemed a surprising tribute to some of the mourners:
T]wo such discoveries the laws of historical development and economic motion] would be enough for one life time. Happy the man to whom it is granted to make even one such discovery. But in every single eld that Marx investigated -and he investigated very many elds, none of them super cially -in every eld, even in that of mathematics, he made independent discoveries. (Works V24: 468)
Soon after, Engels would note in the preface to the second edition of Anti-D uhring (1885: 17) that he intended to publish some further re ections on the natural sciences \in conjunction with the extremely important mathematical manuscripts left by Marx," a promise he was unable to ful ll. In his subsequent role as the principal editor of the third volume of Capital (1894), he would discover a second set of technical notebooks, which included Marx's rst e orts at \mathematical economics": For the third chapter, there was not only a whole series of incomplete mathematical drafts but also an entire notebook from the 1870s, almost complete, which presented the relationship between \On the Concept of the Derived Function" and \On the Concept of the Di erential," as well as drafts of the un nished \On the History of Di erential Calculus" and notes on Lagrange's treatment of in nite series and d'Alembert's limit-based de nition of the derivative. It also includes the commentaries of Yanovskaya and Kol'man (1931) , Kol'man (1968) , Yanovskaya (1968) and Smith (1983) .
translations, was not published until 1968, however. Smolinski (1973) speculates that the cunctation was the unfortunate consequence of the o cial suppression of \mathematical deviation" in Soviet economics after the 1930s, itself a manifestation of the persistent suspicion that formal models often concealed \bourgeois tendencies." 3 This does not account for the treatment of the notebooks outside the Soviet Union after the 1930s, however. With few notable exceptions - Struik (1948) and the aforementioned Smolinski (1973) , for example -the published selections excited little attention in the West and the archives in Amsterdam were seldom consulted. There are at least three possible explanations for this, the simplest, and most charitable, of which involves the sheer size of the archives: most of the numerous drafts, notebooks and letters that Marx left behind were neither \recovered" nor published for decades. (It should be recalled, for example, that the complete Grundrisse, a manuscript at least as important as the mathematical notebooks, was not published until 1953!) A second, more speci c, reason lies in Marx's durable but undeserved reputation for the`liberal' defense of Einsteinian physics," but then disappeared until the 1950s, when he \emerged : : : as an advocate of cybernetics" (Worsley 1971: xvi) . For much of his life, Kol'man seems to have \command ed] a schizophrenic reputation as a liberal in Russia but] a rigid ideologue in his native Czechoslovakia" (Worsley 1971: xvi) . The promise of a Marx-Engels Institute volume was, like Engels' original promise, never realized.
as a poor mathematician, one for whom even arithmetic was di cult. The notion that Marx was an innumerate of sorts, often associated with the critiques of von Bortkiewicz (1890) and Pareto (1903) , owes much to the computational errors and uncertainties familiar to modern readers of Capital, especially the posthumous third volume. The manuscripts reveal, however, that if, as Marx (Works V40: 244) himself once confessed, \I have never felt at home with arithmetic," the principles of more advanced mathematics were much less elusive and, as outlined in the fourth section, provide some support for Shaikh's (1977) claim that his own resolution of the transformation problem was more incomplete than incorrect, and that Marx understood this.
The sense that mathematical methods are somehow inconsistent with Marxian economics has no doubt also limited interest in the archives. Whether or not the recent successes of various strands of \quantitative Marxism" have tempered this view, Marx himself believed, as Lafargue (1891: 13) quotes him, that \a science becomes developed only when it has reached the point where it can make use of mathematics," a proposition from which political economy was not excluded. The archives, as Smolinski (1973) further notes, contain no criticisms of mathematical economics per se, and there are none, as far as I have been able to determine, in his voluminous correspondence either.
The next section outlines the various in uences on Marx's mathematics, with an emphasis on his detailed studies of the calculus. Some, like that of Lagrange's Th eorie des Fonctions Analytiques (1813), are either obvious or explicit, while others, in particular those with roots in his economics, are subtle and often implicit. The third section examines the two \papers" that Marx considered his principal contribution to mathematics, \On the Concept of the Derived Function" and \On the Concept of the Di erential," both of which he nished in 1881, not long before his death. Neither of these can be understood, however, without reference to \On the History of Di erential Calculus," his un nished periodization of the pre-Cauchian period. The fourth and nal section turns to the controversial role of mathematics in his economics, from the little known -\The Mathematical Treatment of the Rate of Surplus Value and the Rate of Pro t" or his correspondence concerning von Th unen's Der Isolierte Staat (1860), for example -to the more familiar Capital.
Marx and the \Golden Zero" 4
Marx's mathematical studies would span more than two decades, from the late 1850s to his death in 1883. His initial interests, practical and often narrow, were the result of research undertaken for the second and third volumes of Capital: some of the notebooks of this period concern commercial arithmetic -the methods used to discount various sorts of bills, for example, are reproduced in a series of exercises -as reviewed in Feller and Odermann's then standard text. There is some evidence that Marx was also interested in the evolution of business mathematics: a letter to his maternal uncle Lion Phillips (Works V41: 514-516), for example, includes a brief discussion of Boethius' De Arithmetica and the historical development of household and commercial accounts. As the computational burdens of Capital became heavier, however, the scope of his studies widened:
In elaborating the principles of economics I have been so damnably 4 Bell (1940: 284) describes the evolution of pre-modern calculus as the Golden Age of Nothing, a reference to the power of the ambivalent -sometimes zero, sometimes not -di erential. L eonard Euler's controversial \calculus of zeroes" was one of several attempts, for example, to resolve the ambivalence with an ordered set of similar, but not identical, zeroes, one of which included the notion of the di erential.
held up by errors of calculation that in despair I have applied myself to a rapid revision of algebra. I have never felt at home with arithmetic. But by making the detour via algebra, I shall quickly get back into the way of things. (Works V40: 244) This work often assumed the form of detailed notes on popular textbooks -Lacroix's Compl ement des El ements d'Algebre (1818), for example -and evinces Marx's initial fascination with in nite series representations of familiar functions, about which more below.
Before the rst volume of Capital (1865) was published, Marx had acquainted himself, for reasons that are not obvious, with the basics of di erential and integral calculus, and would boast that \it is a much easier part of mathematics : : : than the higher parts of algebra, for instance" (Works V41: xx). In an appendix to a letter to Engels written soon after Marx's visit to Manchester in October 1865, for example, he promises:
While I was last : : : in Manchester, you : : : asked me to explain di erential calculus. It] will be quite clear from the following example. The whole of di erential calculus arose : : : from the task of drawing tangents through a point on a curve. So that is the example I am going to use for you : : : What follows is an illustrated explanation of the derivative as the slope of the line between two points that are \in nitely near" one another on a curve, a de nition he soon suspected was unsound. It is after this, Struik (1948) and others have noted, that Marx's studies acquired their more abstract character: the papers on the derived function and di erential, neither of which includes practical illustrations, are perhaps the best example. This does not mean, however, that his mathematics became self-contained or recreational after 1870 -his interest in the foundations of the calculus should be understood in terms of a broader scienti c enterprise, one in which his economics assumed a central role. It should also be remembered that because he died before his \technical studies" were completed, the connections to Marx's other work were never made explicit, and must remain, at least in part, a matter of informed speculation. Yanovskaya (1968) also notes that Marx's formal studies in mathematics were oriented around the texts that Cambridge students used during this period. This is important inasmuch as the foundational contributions of continental thinkers in the 19th century -in particular, Cauchy in the 1820s and Weierstrass in the 1860s -would not be incorporated into the British curriculum for some time, a re ection of the much earlier schism between Newton and Leibnitz. 5 It seems reasonable to conclude that Marx's choice of texts re ects Samuel Moore's in uence as a mentor of sorts. Moore, the Manchester barrister responsible, with Edward Aveling, for the rst English translation of the rst volume of Capital and Engels' assistant in the eventual \reconstruction" of third volume, had studied mathematics as a Cambridge undergraduate in the 1850s. Smolinski (1973) asserts that both Marx and Engels accepted Moore's judgment as the nal word on technical matters, but this overstates his role: from time to time, Marx would complain that Moore did not understand the subtleties of a particular problem. On one such occasion, Marx had written to Moore with an intuition about the decomposition of economic time series into the sum of periodic functions 6 and, after Moore had (mistakenly) declared the 5 The preface to G. H. Hardy's landmark Course in Pure Mathematics (1937) includes a blunt assessment of the Cambridge curriculum before 1900. 6 The fourth section contains a more detailed discussion of this important letter.
The fact that Moore was unfamiliar with Fourier's celebrated Th eorie Analytique de la Chaleur (1822) and other relevant works reveals his limitations as a tutor. problem insoluble, shared his dissatisfaction in a subsequent letter (Works V44: 504) to Engels. In another letter, written after Moore had read, and responded to, \On the Concept of the Derived Function," he complains that his tutor failed to appreciate the fundamental di erences between his own \algebraic" conception of the derivative, and the \geometric" notion still familiar to beginning calculus students: The absence of Cauchy's Cours d'Analyse (1822), whose \new approach led to its own] di culties and generated problems of rigorization for his] successors" (Kitcher 1984: 254) , problems that culminated in Weierstrass' modern foundations for the calculus, from this list is conspicuous. There is no evidence that Marx was familiar with the Cours or that he understood its importance for analysis, a surprise until it is recalled that Moore had in all likelihood never studied it. Even where the Cours was better known, its contents would not be incorporated into textbooks for decades: Struik (1948) notes that the rst such text, Jordan's own Cours d'Analyse, was not published until 1882, long after the contributions of Abel, Dirichlet and Weierstrass had overtaken it! That Marx was also unfamiliar with Weierstrass' \epislontics" 9 then comes as no surprise at all. Historians of mathematics -see 7 Bell (1940: 72) observes that the \chasm between the old and new that opened up in 1821 with the publication of Cauchy's Cours d'Analyse] is plainly visible on comparing two classics Cauchy's just cited, and the third edition, in 1819, of Lacroix's treatise] . If the later work is mathematics, the earlier was not." 8 A complete list of Marx's sources can be found in The Mathematical Manuscipts, pp. 273-274). 9 The term derives from the now standard ; de nitions of limit and derivative.
For more details, see, for example, Kitcher (1984) . the accounts in Bell (1937 Bell ( , 1940 or Kline (1972) , for example -have characterized the dissemination and re nement of Weierstrass' work as a slow and often tentative process, from a series of obscure papers in the 1840s to its professional acceptance in the 1880s.
Because the in uence of continental \innovations" in mathematics on Marx's studies was at best limited, some of his notebooks seem archaic, even primitive, to modern readers, despite Yanovskaya's (1968) forceful argument that he would have rejected such innovations, an assertion rooted in his critique of d'Alembert's Trait e de l'Equilibre et du Mouvement des Fluides (1744), an important precursor of the Cours. Yanovskaya's (1968) inference is a fragile one, however: there was an enormous di erence -even a paradigmatic shift -between d'Alembert and Cauchy on the one hand and, on the other, Weierstrass, and in the context of Marx's professed interest in \algebraic foundations" for the derivative, it is not obvious that he would have dismissed the latter's \wish to establish the calculus : : : upon the concept of number alone" (Boyer 1949: 285) . Nor does an appreciation for Marx's achievements in mathematics turn on this sort of \defense" : there are other senses in which his intuitions could be considered sophisticated. Kol'man and Yanovskaya (1931) and Smith (1983) have also drawn attention to the in uence of Hegel's Science of Logic (1822) -in particular, its treatment of \quantitative in nities" -on Marx's studies. The correspondence between Marx and Engels reveals that both were conversant with Hegel's e orts \to demonstrate that the in nitely small : : : did not] : : : have the negative, empty meaning of a non-nite, non-given magnitude" (Smith 1983: 260 There is a remark about : : : Hegel which I cannot let pass without comment: you deny him any deeper knowledge of the mathematical sciences. Hegel knew so much mathematics that none of his disciples was capable of editing the manuscripts he left behind. The only man who, to my knowledge, has enough understanding of mathematics and philosophy to be able to do so is Marx. (Works V42: 138) Much later, after Engels had read \On the Concept of the Derived Function," he wrote Marx, to tell him that it con rmed one of Hegel's intuitions in Science of Logic:
So old Hegel was quite right in supposing that the basic premise for di erentiation was that most variables must be of varying powers and at least one of them must be the power of at least 2 or 1/2. Now we also know why. (Works V46: 131) This is an awkward reference to Marx's discussion of the derivative in terms of the coe cients in series expansions, part of his broader interest in algebraic foundations for the calculus, the same interest that had motivated Lagrange.
This said, if Marx understood and, for the most part, endorsed Hegel's criticisms, he shared none of the latter's obvious disdain for mathematics, a posture that, in the end, limited both Hegel's audience and his in uence. Mathematicians could, in turn, dismiss the sometimes impenetrable dialecticism of Science of Logic as the cri de coeur of a crude polemicist. 11 10 Lange, the philosopher and sometime political economist, was also a prominent member of the First International, and is perhaps best remembered for the neoKantian History of Materialism and Criticism of its Present Importance (1877).
To understand Marx's desire to recast the foundations of the calculus, one must turn to \On the History of Di erential Calculus," the un nished periodization that served much the same role in his mathematical studies as Theories of Surplus Value did in his economic ones, albeit on a much smaller scale. The terms and notation are sometimes eccentric, but the periodization is sensible and modern: Bell, in his Development of Mathematics (1940) , for example, identi es the same three preCauchian schools. In Marx's language, these are the \mystical di erential calculus" of Newton and Leibnitz, the \rational di erential calculus" of Euler and d'Alembert, and the \algebraic calculus" of Lagrange.
The criticism of Newton's \ uents" and \ uxions" there will remind some readers of Bishop Berkeley's infamous jeremiad in The Analyst (1734), published more than a century before. It is di cult to believe, in fact, that neither Marx nor Moore were unfamiliar with it -he was a source of preoccupation in British mathematics for decades 12 -despite the fact that neither mentions it. To recast cisms of astronomers -he once announced, for example, that the search for additional planets was doomed to failure -secured an unfair reputation as an innumerate of sorts. He also notes, however, that the in uential Kr onecker was an important exception.
the critique in terms of an example familiar to both Marx and modern readers, let Q = F(L) = a + bL + cL 2 be the output of \corn" on a particular plot of land, a quadratic function of the number of laborers L hired. If L increases from L 0 to L 1 = L 0 + dL, where dL is Leibnitz's di erential, the increase in output Q 1 ; Q 0 = dQ is equal, after some simpli cation, to b(dL) + 2cL 0 (dL) + c(dL) 2 . If the squared term is much smaller than the rst two, then (b + 2cL 0 )dL becomes a reasonable approximation for dQ -that is, dQ (b+2cL 0 )dL or dQ=dL b+2cL 0 .
This did not mean, as Marx and others before him understood, however, that dQ and (b + 2cL 0 )dL were equal unless dL was itself zero, an essential feature of Berkeley's critique in The Analyst. Nor could these di culties be resolved if, as textbooks of the time often recommended, the ratio of b(dL)+2cL 0 (dL)+c(dL) 2 to dL were calculated before the latter was set equal to zero because, as Marx (1983: 82-83) explains it:
The nulli cation of dL] may not take place prior to the rst derived function of L], here b + 2cL], having been freed of the factor dL] through division, thus Q 1 ;Q 0 =dL = b+2cL 0 ]. Only then may the nite di erences be annulled. The di erential coe cient dQ=dL = b + 2cL] therefore also must have been previously developed : : : before we may obtain the di erential dQ=dL = b + 2cL]. This is Berkeley's \ghosts of departed quantities" argument in dialectical terms: if dL is zero, then dQ must also be zero, in which case the ratio dQ=dL = 0=0 is nonsensical, but if dL is non-zero, then it cannot be made to \disappear."
This did not mean that the achievements of the \mystics" were underestimated, however. In his Anti-D urhing, Engels (1885: 98) would echo Marx's admiration thus:
With the introduction of variable magnitudes and the extension of their variability to the in nitely small and in nitely large, math-ematics, in some respects so strictly moral, fell from grace it ate from the tree of knowledge, which opened up to it a career of most colossal achievements, but at the same time a path of error. The virgin state of absolute validity and irrefutable certainty of everything mathematical was gone forever : : : We] have reached the point where most people di erentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing but from pure faith, because up to now it has always come out right.
Read from this perspective, \On the History of Di erential Calculus" is also a meditation on the strengths and weaknesses of \practical science," science that risks being misled, to paraphase Marx's later dismissal of Hume's economics, by the \appearance of things."
How much, if at all, Marx's critique of Newton and Leibnitz re ects his prior work in economics is an important but to date overlooked question. As alluded to in the introduction, the in uence is implicit, but it seems impossible that he never visualized these \variable magnitudes" in economic terms. The texts with which he was acquainted often borrowed from the \harder" sciences to illustrate and, in some cases, demonstrate basic principles, and the possibilities for \translation" must have seemed irresistible. It is still the case, for example, that economics students with even minimal mathematical skills perceive opportunities to formalize elements of Ricardo's Principles (1817) , a text with which Marx was of course familiar, in di erential terms. The same students often nd it di cult, however, to conceptualize the \in nitesimal increment" in terms of land or labor, a problem that Marx never discusses but could well have contemplated. He believed, for example, that von Th unen's Der Isolierte Staat (1860), which did so, was an important, if not landmark, contribution to the classical tradition. 13 It is at least conceivable, then, that the abstractness of Marx's mathematics after 1870s was in some small measure attributable to the \discontinuities" in his notion of economic movement, which would have underscored the shortcomings of smooth and well-behaved di erential representations. In this context, Smolinski's (1973) observation that Moore would recommend George Boole's Calculus of Finite Di erences (1880) to Marx acquires particular signi cance: Boole's calculus is prima facie more consistent with Marxian priors. It is unfortunate, therefore, that he never found the time to read Calculus of Finite Di erences or, for that matter, Boole's interest in the separation of the \symbols of mathematical operations from the objects on which these] operate" (Bell 1937: 438) , which has similarities to Marx's concern with \strategies of action."
Marx's account of the \mystical" origins of the calculus also raise another question: To what extent did his characterization of the di erential re ect a suspicion of the \unseen" in mathematics? Philosophers and historians of mathematics have sometimes dismissed similar passages in Berkeley's earlier critique, for example, as the unsophisticated outburst of someone who would have also rebelled at the notion of a \complex number," another \invisible" construction. While there is little doubt that \suspicions of the invisible" animate The Analyst, Jesseph (1993) and others have demonstrated that Berkeley was no less convinced that Newton's \ uxions" were inconsistent on their own terms. Furthermore, despite Berkeley's iconographic status as the embodiment of clerical resistance to science, his reading of Newton was \competent but uncharitable" 14 (Kitcher 1984: 239 ). Marx's periodization merits the late 1870s, is also discussed in the fourth section. 14 Kitcher's (1984) quali cation is based on several ambiguous passages in Newton's Treatise on Quadrature, which seem to anticipate the limit arguments of a similar verdict: his discussion of the \e ective operation" of di erentiation seems to reveal some of the same suspicions but, in the end, underscores the internal contradictions of pre-Cauchian calculus. One is therefore tempted to wonder how Marx would have responded to recent interest in so-called \non-standard methods" in mathematical economics, in which an arithmetic of the in nitesmal has been axiomatized. 15 Marx locates the transition to the \rational di erential" calculus in d'Alembert's Trait e (1744), one of the rst monographs to de ne the derivative in terms of the ratio of limits: for the previous production function Q = F(L), dQ=dL
The substitution of L for dL as one of the de nition's primitives \stripped the mystical veil from the di erential calculus and so constituted] an enormous step forward," (Marx 1983: 97) one that mathematicians had resisted for some time. Marx (1983: 97) further indicates that despite d'Alembert's achievement, the \Leibnitzian method continued to prevail for years in France" while \Newton prevailed in England until the rst decades of the nineteenth century," a verdict with which most historians of mathematics would more or less concur.
d'Alembert's \solution" is seen to be awed, however: As] with the mystics, the derivative function] already existed as d'Alembert and others. 15 For an introduction to non-standard methods and their uses in economics, see Anderson (1993) . To the extent that the rehabilitation of the \in nitesmal" allows the notion of an \atomistic" actor to be formalized, these methods have resonated more with neo-classical economists than others. It is no development but rather a separation of f 0 (L)] : : : from its factor h and from the neighboring terms : : : in the second series.
What has on the other hand really been developed is the left-hand, symbolic, side, namely dL], dQ] and their ratio, the symbolic di erential coe cient dQ=dL] = 0=0 : : : which in turn once more generates certain metaphysical shudderings, although the symbol has been mathematically derived. (Marx 1983: 96) The problem seems to lie in the machinations -more reasonable than those of Newton and Liebnitz, but still unsound -needed to disentangle derivatives that are known a priori from the nite and non-zero increment h but if so, Marx's preferred de nition (see below) is vulnerable on the same grounds. More important, however, Marx locates the real contribution of Trait e des Fluides in its treatment of dQ=dL an operator or as, he describes it, a \strategy of action," rather than as the ratio of ill-conceived in nitesmals. From this perspective, the notation dQ=dL embodies a nite series of well-de ned arithmetic or algebraic operations, in which the \numerator" dQ and \denominator" dL are not independent entities and so do not call for interpretation as such. The frequent references to \strategies of action" would lead some overenthusiastic Soviet mathematicians -Struik (1948) cites Glivenko's (1935) paper as an example -to conclude that Marx anticipated Hadamard's so-called \operator calculus." Even if the similarities are overdrawn, however, comparisons of this sort underscore the relative sophistication of Marx's critique.
One of the appendices to this notebook then reviews the confusion between \limit value" and \value at the limit," one that subverted textbook presentations of the so-called rational calculus until the 1840s! Hind's Principles of Di erential Calculus (1831), for example, the Cambridge course book mentioned earlier, de ned the former as the \last value" of a function evaluated at the \last value" of its argument. Marx's suspicion that the terms in common use exacerbated this confusion lead him to propose \absolute minimal expression" as a substitute for \limit value," with little expectation that it would be adopted. Marx (1983: 88) then identi es the \false idealization" of movement as a second weakness of the rational calculus. One could understand this as the claim that the motion embodied in d'Alembert's notion of limit is smoother than observed or actual however, that this resolves the \false idealization" problem and regardless, both the inference and the original argument are tenuous. The source of the uneasiness is not di cult to uncover: if F(L) is a continuous function on the real numbers -and all the particular functions he considers are members of this class -then d'Alembert's sequence, \realistic" or not, is an admissable one. The provenance of this critique can be found, I believe, in the sometimes forced representation of economic (and other social) relationships in terms of continuous functions: the production function F(L), for example, is perhaps better de ned on some, much smaller, subset of the real numbers. There is no doubt that even if these are not identi ed as such, Marx's economics involves functions of this sort -under most interpretations, his account of the \anarchy of production," for example, exploits what later writers would call the \lumpiness" of constant capital -but whether or not he was conscious of the role of \practical discontinuities" in his mathematics is much less certain. Marx (1983: 99) then introduces Lagrange's Th eorie des Fonctions Analytiques (1813) as the rst \algebraic" treatise on the calculus, algebraic inasmuch as its \starting point : : : is Taylor where p q r : : : are functions of L but not h. If F 0 (L) is equal to p, it is then not di cult to show that F 00 (L) = 2!q, F 000 (L) = 3!r, and so on, an observation that inspired Lagrange to claim that this approach had \the advantage of showing how the terms of the series depend on each other, and especially how when one knows how to form the rst derivative function, one can form all the derivative functions which enter the series" (Kline 1972: 431) . What remains to be shown, of course, is that F 0 (L) = p, and here the Th eorie stumbles: Lagrange asserts that for \small" h, all but the rst two terms in the equation can be ignored, in which case F(L + h) ; F(L) = ph, the sort of \proof" he, and later Marx, would disavow. 16 It 16 We now know, of course, that the existence of the relevant derivatives is a prerequisite for this expansion. Kline (1972: 426-434 ) reviews the literature in more detail.
was the expansion itself that concerned Marx, however: T]he equation : : : is not only not proved but indeed knowingly or unknowingly assumes a substitution of variables for constants, which ies in the face of all the laws of algebra : : : the derivation of this equation from algebra : : : appears to rest on a deception. (Marx 1983: 117) As much as it can be deciphered, the criticism seems misdirected but the intuition -that the conventional demonstration of the theorem was awed -is sound and, in some senses, prescient: Bell (1940: 285) reminds us that Taylor's rst proof in Methodus Incrementorum Directa et Inversa (1715) was \nonsense" despite the fact that its modern \equivalent could be found] in texts on the calculus as late as 1945." Lagrange's restatement of Taylor's Theorem was one of the rst to append the now familiar remainder term, even if his de nition of the derivative failed to account for it, but he provided no rigorous proof. Marx (1983: 116-118) would also claim that the treatment of p q r : : : was careless inasmuch as Langrange assumed, with little justi cation, that the coe cients were nite. 17 Marx nevertheless admired Th eorie des Fonctions Analytiques as the rst \modern" text of its kind, in the sense that it presented the calculus without recourse to in nitesimals or limits. There is no reason to believe that he doubted the \truthfulness" of the series expansions under well-speci ed conditions, but preferred, it seems, to seek alternative foundations. Given his own limitations as an amateur mathematician, however, these new foundations would assume the form of 17 The criticism was perhaps unfair. Lagrange dismissed as \exceptional cases" in nite-valued functions, in nite-valued derivatives and fractional powers, all contentious problems in analysis then. a simple but narrow de nition of the derivative consistent with his commitment to the \algebraic school."
It is unfortunate, however, that Marx did not read Methodus Incrementorum in more detail. The introduction to in nite series there followed an inceptive treatment of the calculus of nite di erences that anticipated Boole's much later work, the same work Moore had earlier recommended to Marx. 3. Marx's \Contributions" to the Foundations of the Calculus
On the Concept of the Derived Function
The search for better foundations for the derivative, for a de nition consistent with the rules of arithmetic and his own priors on the abstract representation of \motion," became the principal focus of Marx's mathematical studies after the mid-1870s. There is some evidence, however, that the search concluded before he otherwise planned: in an earlier notebook, for example, he reminds himself to read Landon's The Residual Analysis (1764), which Hind (1831) and Lacroix (1863) both characterized as a forerunner of Th eorie des Fonctions Analytiques, but there is no evidence in subsequent manuscripts that he ever found the time to do so. There is little reason to believe, on the other hand, that Landon's text would have exerted much in uence on \On the Concept of the Derived Function," the rst of the companion papers nished in the fall of 1881. There, Marx (1983: 6) 
Marx calls this the \preliminary derivative" of F(L) and asserts that it is \the limit value of the ratio of the nite di erences : : : and not] the limit value of the ratio of di erentials" (Marx 1983: 6) . The derived function the obtains when L \reaches the limit of its decrease" and L 1 \is changed into" L 0 : if L 0 = L 1 , in other words, the previous expression becomes the desired b + 2cL 0 , from which he draws two basic conclusions. First, because L 0 and L 1 are set equal to one another, \in the strict mathematical sense their di erence is zero, and there is] no subterfuge about merely approaching in nitely closely]" (Marx 1983 in the original function, nally produces the`derivative,' that is, the preliminary derivative reduced to its absolute minimum quantity. (Marx 1983: 7) As Smith (1983) summarizes it, Marx's \de nition" is not di cult to formalize: for the primitive function f(x), de ne the two variable function F(x z) f(x) ; f(z), and then factor F(x z) into the product of the di erence term x ; z and a second multivariate function, G(x z), where the latter is the preliminary derivative. The derived function f 0 (x) is then equal to G(x x). 19 Within its particular historical context, the Marxian calculus seems reasonable but incomplete. The conditions under which F(x z) could, or could not, be factored into (x ;z)G(x z), for example, are never considered in detail: Marx (1983: 10-12) relies on a familiar series expansion to calculate G(x z) in one case, for example, but then fails to consider, on his own terms, the connection between derived functions and the existence of such expansions. 20 Furthermore, Marx assumes, without cause, that G(x x) must be continuous at (x x).
From the modern perspective, one constructed on Weierstrassian foundations, the limitations of Marx's mathematics are more immediate. There is a temptation, then, to dismiss his \contribution" to the calculus as outdated, even simplistic, but this would be unfair. First, and as a practical matter, Marx was able, following well-B(x dx))dx. For more details, see, for example, Kitcher (1984: 234-236) . 20 If it exists, the series expansion of f(x+h) around h = 0 has the form f(x+h) = f(x) + ph + qh 2 + : : : which, for h = z ; x, implies that f(z) = f(x) + p(z ; x) + q(z ; x) 2 + r(z ; x) 3 + : : : or, rearranging terms, f(z) ; f(x) z ; x = p + q(z ; x) + r(z ; x) 2 + : : :
When z is equal to x, the right hand side collapses to p, from which Marx should have inferred that the existence of a well-behaved series expansion was a su cient condition for di erentiation. That he would have been incorrect had he done sorecall that the existence of all the relevant derivatives was later discovered to be a prerequisite for the expansion -is beside the point: from his perspective, this was a sensible proposition.
marked paths, to di erentiate a number of familiar and important functions without direct recourse to limits or in nitesmals. The rst of these, f(x) = ax 3 +bx 2 +cx;e, involves no technical di culties -x 3 ; z 3 is factored into the product of x ; z and x 2 +xz +z 2 -and serves to illustrate his basic themes. Nor does the second function f(x) = ax m , from which the reader is supposed to infer that all functions of the form a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 + : : : + a m x m can be di erentiated using this method. The third function Marx (1983: 10-12) considers, f(x) = a x , is much less tractable: the derivation of G(x z) relies on the (unproven) binomial expansion of a related function, (1 + (a ; 1)) z;x . 21 The fourth and nal function f(x) = p a 2 + x 2 , also involves (minor) complications: the di erence term z ; x must, in Marx's words, be \manufactured" from f(z) ; f(x).
The bona de contribution of \On the Concept of the Derived Function," 21 Marx rst rewrites the di erence f(z);f(x) = a x (a z;x ;1) as (1+(a;1)) z;x and observes that the latter has the binomial expansion: Marx then observes that the in nite series in brackets is the power series expansion for log a, and concludes, correctly, that f 0 (x) = a x log a. Kol'man (1968) and others have suggested, lies in Marx's algorithmic treatment of the derivative. Within the Marxian calculus, the derivative df(x)=dx becomes a \strategy of action," a well-de ned and nite sequence of algebraic operations on f(x). It is, furthermore, an operator that can be extended to \discrete" functions -the production function Q = F(L) when labor power is available in classical \doses," for example -but whether or not Marx understood this is not clear. Yanvoskaya (1968: 15) situates Marx's interest in algorithms for di erentiation as part of a broader commitment to the \e ective operation" of mathematical and scienti c principles. From this perspective, the Leibnitzian di erential is a awed primitive for the calculus because, to repeat a claim made earlier, it is inconsistent with both the rules of arithmetic and the realities of economic and other motion. This position is one that, in its extreme form, reduces to a crude version of mathematical intuitionism, but there is little textual evidence that Marx intends this. 22 This said, he then reiterates what he believes to be the foundational di erences between his de nition and the alternative(s):
Although the] reduction of x 1 to x 0 within the derived function] changes the left hand side from] y= x to 0=0 or dy=dx, so that the derivative appears as the limit value of the ratio of the di erential : : : the transcendental or symbolic mistake which appears only on the left hand side has : : : lost its terror since it now appears only as the expression of a process which has established its real content on the right hand side. (Marx 1983: 7-9) The same principles also inform Marx's (1983: 8) subsequent discussion of higher 22 It cannot be coincidence, on the other hand, that Kr onecker, the most in uential advocate of intuitionism during this period, shared Marx's appreciation for Hegel's Science of Logic (1822).
order derived functions as members of a \genealogical register" of derivatives, and a source of confusion when treated as \the starting point of the exercise, instead of : : : the expressions of successively derived functions of x." Considered from this vantage point, d y =dx 2 is a \purely symbolic equation" that represents no more, but no less, than the twice repeated application of the same operator.
On the Concept of the Di erential
Like the rst of Marx's nished papers on the calculus, \On the Concept of the Di erential" was completed in the fall of 1881. In it, he shifts the \initiative : : : from the right hand pole, the algebraic, to the left hand one, the symbolic" (Marx 1983: 20) or, as he also describes it, the \own ground" of the calculus, the di erential, from where the \dialectical nature" of the calculus can be better elucidated. He devotes the rst half of the paper to a deconstruction of the familiar product rule: if u and v are both di erentiable functions of x, and y is de ned to be the product of u and v, then dy=dx = u(dv=dx)+v(du=dx) or, in terms that he considered deceptive, dy = u(dv) + v(du). Marx does so to illustrate mathematical propositions without \real content" -that is, propositions on the operators themselves. Marx (1983: 15) rst notes that the di erence y 1 ; y 0 = u( This is unremarkable, of course, unless x 1 is set equal to x 0 , \so that x 1 ; x 0 = 0, likewise u 1 ; u 0 = 0, z 1 ; z 0 so that the factor z 1 in the second term above] also goes to z 0 and] nally on the left hand side y 1 ; y 0 = 0," which leads to the product rule. This is a reasonable argument if, as outlined in \On the Concept of the Derived Function," du=dx and dv=dx are understood to be operators or \strategies of action" and not the problematic form 0=0 or, worse, just 0. The rst, 0=0, is misleading inasmuch as \the numerator in this form remains inseparable from the denominator while the second is because] even in the usual algebra it would be false" (Marx 1983: 17) , as the discussion of f(x) = (x 2 ; a 2 )=(x ; a) at x = a that follows serves to illustrate.
The second half of the paper considers the di erential form dy = f 0 (x)dx in more detail. The expression \appears : : : more suspicious than the di erential coe cient dy=dx = f 0 (x) from which it is derived" because, as Marx (1983: 24-25) repeats, \in dy=dx = 0=0 the numerator and denominator are : : : bound but] in dy = f 0 (x)dx they seem to be] separated, so that one is forced to conclude] that it is only a disguised expression for 0 = f 0 (x) 0 or 0 = 0, whereupon`nothing's to be done.' " This was Boucharlat's (1828) judgment, for example, who believed that \in order to facilitate algebraic operation, one must] introduce a : : : false formula which one baptises the di erential" (Marx 1983: 25) . The confusion, presented as an inevitable consequence of the foundational crisis in mathematics, cannot be resolved until it is understood that dy, \considered in isolation, that is, without its real equivalent : : : assumes the same role as y in the algebraic method" (Marx 1983: 27) and dx is treated likewise.
Marx and Mathematical Economics
While I have explored the possible in uences of Marx's economics on both the direction of his mathematical studies and the substance of his critique of the calculus, it remains to consider the possible e ects of this technical work on his understanding of capitalism. \The Mathematical Treatment of the Rate of Surplus Value and the Rate of Pro t" (1875), the notebook mentioned in the introduction, is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this in uence. 23 The editorial decision to use a less \abstract" version of the third chapter in the third volume of Capital was not, as hinted earlier, Engels' alone: in the preface, the latter notes that Moore's role in the reconstruction of the relevant arguments was crucial. Both had reason to believe that their choice was a fortiori consistent with Marx's wishes: he was once pleased to tell Engels, for example, that \in the nal elaboration, the second volume of Capital] is, I believe, assuming a tolerably popular form, aside from a few unavoidable M-C's and C-M's" (Works V41: 488). Capital was written, in other words, for a diverse audience, and to infer from the absence of \formal" models an opposition to their use is to overlook authorial intention: the elaborate restatement of Quesnay's Tableau in a subsequent letter ) is an eloquent demonstration of his interest in such models.
There was, however, a second sensible rationale for the choice Engels and Moore would make: Marx's \Mathematical Treatment" is in one sense a failure. Written in the mid 1870s, at which point Marx could claim to be familiar with (for example) di erential equations, its relative unsophistication -in particular, its continued reliance on numerical examples -comes as a disappointment. His treatment of the manuscript's benchmark equation, reviewed in Smolinski (1973) , is representative: from the initial observation that p = mv=(c + v), where p is the rate of pro t, m is the rate of surplus value, c is constant capital and v is variable capital, Marx shows, after tedious calculation, that the rate of pro t decreases, ceteris paribus, as the composition of capital c=v increases, a proposition that required little or no arithmetic, as Moore later noted in the margin. His earlier confession -\I have never felt at home with arithmetic" (Works V40: 244) -notwithstanding, it seems that Marx never overcame his intuitive reliance on speci c numerical examples. Smolinski (1973) claims, on the other hand, that despite computational errors, Marx's \laborious methods" did achieve the same ends as the more sophisticated methods now familiar to all economists. This is a little premature, however. The connection between p and m can be elucidated from several perspectives, some more laborious than others, but it should be recalled that subsequent e orts to formalize the various schemes of reproduction and to \solve" the transformation problem, which subsumes the relationship between p and m, have often relied on the use of matrices, a tool uncommon in Marx's lifetime and unknown, it is reasonable to assume, to Moore. Where matrix methods are not used, a complete characterization of the properties of the Marxian model still calls for the abstract manipulation of at least \departmental" equations. This raises a di cult question, however: Are the ostensible defects in Marx's own solution to the transformation problem -in particular, his treatment of the means of production -in some measure attributable to his reliance on numerical examples? Is it possible, in other words, that his reliance on arithmetic methods predisposed Marx to \solutions" with smaller computational burdens?
A complete discussion of the various proposed solutions to the transformation problem -one that would distinguish, for example, between those Marx himself might have o ered, and those he perhaps should have -lies well outside the scope of this paper, of course, but even so, it is not di cult to argue that the answer is no. 24 In particular, Shaikh (1977) nds textual evidence in Capital for the view that Marx understood the need to extend the \price-value disproportionalities" but decided, for a number of reasons, to postpone whatever further calculations were required: A]part from the fact that the price of a particular] product : : : diverges from its value : : : the same situation also holds for the commodities that form the constant part of its] capital and indirectly, also, its variable capital, as means of subsistence for the workers. (Marx 1894: 261) Furthermore, Shaikh (1977) con rms that if the particular methods Marx used to compute equilibrium prices are iterated, with the prices of outputs in each \round" becoming the prices of inputs in the next, the resulting sequence tends, in the limit, toward the prices calculated with more conventional methods. If so, the treatment in the un nished third volume should be understood as the rst iteration in a convergent \values to prices algorithm" that constitutes one solution to the 24 The fact that I am not a disinterested observer of the relevant debates - Matthews (2000) , for example, estimates a model of the circuit of capital that relies on the so-called \new solution" (Foley 1982 ) -is (for me, at least) a further complication. It should also be noted that some redares -Wol , Roberts and Callari (1982) and other \single system" advocates, for example -would counter that there is no problem in the usual sense, and that the quali cation quoted below is a red herring of sorts. infamous problem. Whether or not this algorithm satis es all of the properties Marx and his followers have advocated is, in this narrow context, beside the point. On the other hand, the need to postpone calculation of successive iterations would not have arisen if Marx had been able to overcome his \addiction to arithmetic." A second, perhaps more remarkable, manifestation of the in uence of Marx's mathematics on his economics can be found in a letter to Engels dated 31 May 1873:
I have been telling Moore about a problem with which I have been racking my brains for some time now. However, he thinks it is insoluble, at least pro tempore, because of the many factors involved, factors which for the most part have yet to be discovered. The problem is this: you know about those graphs in which the movements of prices, discount rates, etc, etc, over the year, etc, are shown in rising and falling zigzags. I have variously attempted to analyse crises by calculating these`ups and downs'as irregular curves and believed (and still believe it would be possible if the empirical] material were su ciently studied) that I might be able to determine mathematically the principal laws governing crises. As I said, Moore thinks it cannot be done at present and I have resolved to give it up for the time being. (Works V44: 504) Leontief (1938) , one of the rst to draw widespread attention to the letter, discerned in these lines the elements of the \statistical : : : approach to business cycles" later identi ed as the \NBER approach" of Mitchell (1913) and others. Much later, Kol'man (1968) would advance an even more sophisticated, and perhaps more tenuous, interpretation, one based on the resolution of economic time series into combinations of periodic functions of various frequencies -that is, the spectral decomposition of (in this case) prices and discount rates. Because Marx's published correspondence contains no other references of this kind, Kol'man's (1968) judgment is di cult to substantiate, but it seems conceivable that Marx, in his e orts to characterize the laws of economic motion, would have at least considered the decomposition of prices, values and/or quantities into short, medium and long waves. If this was indeed Marx's intention, Moore's response was mistaken: most of the relevant mathematical principles had been articulated some time earlier, in Fourier's Th eorie Analytique de la Chaleur (1822). Moore would not have been alone in his assessment, however: empirical research in economics, mainstream or radical, would not experiment with these methods for some time. Kol'man (1968: 222) also nds hints, here and elsewhere, that Marx understood \the statistical nature of economic mechanisms as mechanisms of large scale processes : : : a principle with] great methodological signi cance for mathematical statistics." The principle to which Kol'man refers is the (controversial) proposition that speci c realizations of economic variables can be described in probabilistic terms and that means, over both time and space, should \dominate" deviations. He cites as further evidence a passage from Grundrisse:
The value of commodities as determined by labor time is only their average value. This average appears as an external abstraction if it is calculated as an average gure of an epoch : : : but is very real if it is at the same time recognized as the driving force and the moving principle of the oscillations which commodity prices run through during a given epoch. This reality is not merely of theoretical importance: it forms the basis of mercantile speculation, whose calculus of probabilities depends both on : : : price averages which gure as the centre of oscillation, and on the average peaks and average troughs of oscillation above or below this centre. (Marx 1857: 137) In econometric terms, the deviations of prices from \average values" are in e ect treated as an autocorrelated process with mean zero and constant variance -that is, a stochastic version of the natural price doctrine of classical economics. It should also be noted that the oscillations Marx describes are the cause, not the e ect, of \mercantile speculation."
(If one stretches a little, this could also, or perhaps instead, be understood as a statement of the \law of value" in statistical terms. In this context, the recent work of Cockshott and Cottrell (1997) , who nd that market prices are better correlated with the sum of direct and indirect labor than other inputs, merits particular attention.)
What little there is to learn about Marx's response to the work of the \mathe-matical economists" of his own time must also be inferred from his correspondence. In a latter dated March 1868, for example, he refers to Henry Dunning Macleod as that \stilted jackass who expresses every banal tautology (1) in algebraic form, and (2) constructs it geometrically" (Works V42: 543). Kol'man (1968) and others have concluded that Marx was therefore familiar with the e orts of neo-classical writers to provide \scienti c veneer" for their work: Jevons, for example, in the preface to his \Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy" (1860), would ackowledge Macleod's Elements of Political Economy, as well as the work of Bentham and Jennings, as an important in uence. 25 While there is little doubt that Marx would have criticized these e orts, there is also little evidence that he drew a connection between Macleod and Jevons or, for that matter, between Macleod and neo-classicism as it is now understood. In the same letter, he adds that \I have already given Macleod] a passing kick in the pamphlet published by Duncker : : : his`great' discovery is: credit is capital" (Works V42: 543).
25 Blaug (1985) documents Macleod's limited role in the so-called \marginalist revolution."
The pamphlet to which Marx refers is A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1860) and it is Macleod's Theory and Practice of Banking (1856) that is discussed there, not the Elements.
Furthermore, Marx's criticism of Macleod, later repeated in the rst volume of Capital, was more muted than his letter hints: Macleod, described as a \successful cross between the superstitious mercantilists and the enlightened peddlars of free trade," is said to have \trick ed] out the confused ideas of Lombard Street in their most learned nery" (Marx 1865: 153) . The \banal tautologies : : : in algebraic form" are crude balance sheets and, as Engels notes in a footnote, Macleod's error was the mistaken belief \that money in general arises from its most advanced form, that is the means of payment." 26 In fact, neither Jevons nor Gossen, the pre-eminent practitioners of (orthodox) mathematical economics in Marx's lifetime, are mentioned in his letters. There are no less than three references to von Th unen's Der Isolierte Staat (1860), however. The rst occurs in a letter to Ludwig Kugelman 27 written in January 1868 (Works V42: 522) in which Marx asks that von Th unen's book be purchased for him in Hanover. Two months later, he would tell Kugelman that: T]here is something touching about it]. A Mecklenberg squire 26 Schumpeter (1954: 115) notes that Macleod's explanation of bank credit formation, a precursor of modern orthodox models, attracted little attention in his own lifetime, despite Marx's \passing kick." He attributes this to Macleod's \inability to put his many good ideas in a professionally acceptable form."
: : : who treats his estate of Tellow as the land and MecklenbergSchwerin as the town and who, proceeding from these premises, constructs for himself the Ricardian theory of ground rent, with the help of observation, di erential calculus and] practical accountancy. This is estimable and at the same time ridiculous. (Works V42: 543) Almost a decade after this, he would write to Herman Schumacher, the German economist who had published Der Isolierte Staat and, as a companion volume, an introduction to von Th unen's life and work, in much warmer terms: \I have always regarded him] as something of an exception among German economists, since it is exceedingly rare for an objective and independent inquirer to be found in their midst" (Works V45: 90) . What is most remarkable about the third letter, though, is Marx's declaration that he \would endorse : : : in its entirety" Schumacher's appreciative preface \if our attitude to`wages' did not di er : : : he regards wages as the immediate expression of a genuine economic relation while] I regard them as a spurious form concealing a content materially di erent from the expression of that form" (Works V45: 90).
Nowhere, it should be underscored, does Marx object to von Th unen's extensive and innovative use of mathematics. Because Der Isolierte Staat contains few theoretical innovations, it is reasonable to infer that, in some measure, Marx's favorable impression re ects von Th unen's methodology. As Schumpeter (1954: 466-467) reminds us, he was one of the rst to characterize economic phenomena in terms of the calculus, to substantiate his various \laws" with established tendencies in observed data, and, with Cournot, to represent simple forms of interdependence in terms of simultaneous equations models.
Conclusion
The belief that Marx neither understood nor endorsed the use of mathematical methods has somehow persisted to the present. An examination of his mathematical and technical papers reveals an interest in commercial and abstract mathematics that spanned more than two decades, however, and evinces su cient command over the calculus for Marx to have proposed an alternative, albeit narrow, de nition of the derivative. His economics both motivated and, this paper has attempted to show, informed these studies, which in turn lead to at least one technical exposition of value-price relations, the failed \Mathematical Treatment of the Rate of Surplus Value and the Rate of Pro t." This said, his response to the e orts of some mathematical economists -in particular, von Th unen -suggests that he considered the abstract representation of economic relations a sensible ambition.
